The previous two chapters dealt with trying to understand the dialectic between the Malaysian state and migrant transnational actors. In Chapter 5, for instance, I considered how the state can, at specific times and in particular situations, have political interests that overlap with those of the Chins and Acehnese. In Chapter 6, I considered the state at the more localised level -at the point of interaction between state agents and migrants, where we were able to see the state in a more disaggregated form, giving us an insight into how Acehnese and Chin migrants manage to gain some political space and capital from these local-level interactions through a series of different strategies. In this chapter, I continue down the path of trying to understand the interaction between the state and migrant transnational actors, this time in relation to the role that identities and political belonging play in shaping this dialectic.
among migrants. In the first instance, it provides migrants with some sort of sanctioned status and legitimacy in the eyes of the state that then affords them the basics in terms of some measure of human security, means to earn a livelihood, as well as access to basic services such as health care and other social if not legal rights (which in Malaysia are limited). Statesanctioned identities also afford some measure of stability for migrants while residing in the host state, helping to reduce, if not completely prevent the risk of deportation, harassment and other punitive actions being levelled against them. This in turn enables migrants to utilise state infrastructure, to navigate the streets and highways of the host state with far greater ease, for their political ends.
But what happens when state-generated identities are not available to migrants? Does this then close off all possibilities to be political? Not necessarily. In this chapter, I consider other identities that have enabled migrants to act politically, keeping in mind that while these identities were not necessarily originally secured with the intention of engaging in transnational political acts, they have nonetheless played a contributing role in allowing migrants to do so. Having some sort of state or internationally sanctioned identity, or even community-based identity, has, for instance, enabled the Acehnese and Chinsin Malaysia to become donors for their own political cause and to hold meetings and demonstrations.
In the course of my research, I found that there are several different routes through which migrants have attained "legalised" identities. One way is through the issuing of permanent residency by the state. Another way is through the conferral of status by an international authority such as UNHCR. When neither of these options were available, migrants have innovated and generated their own legitimising identity, complete with documentation designed to mimic state-like types of identity formation and credibility.
To explore these points in greater depth, I draw on several case studies, beginning with the phenomenon during the mid-1980s in which a significant number of Acehnese, among them GAM operatives, were given permanent resident status by the Malaysian state. This coincided with the desire of the Malaysian government to create new "Malays" to ensure the continued political dominance of the Malays. Providing avenues for people to have some sort of legal status in Malaysia, be it through permanent residency or work permits, also fell in line with the country's economic boom period and the need for labour in the 1980s and 1990s.
Another case study pertains to the Chins' attempts to generate their own identities, as an interim measure, while they await a state or transnationally sanctioned identity. I explore how this is done by the two main Chin refugee organisations, in return for an annual fee (tax) and other obligations that come with membership in the ACR and CRC. The final case study details the effort made by the Chins to comply with the UNHCR social construction of refugee status and how this identity too provides some measure of stability and security whilst living in Malaysia.
For migrants, international identity regimes such as the UNHCR-conferred refugee and asylum seeker status enable them to use Malaysia as place of transit while they wait for the situation in the homeland to improve or to emigrate to the West. The importance of securing refugee status is not lost on the Chins, who form part of the transnational political constituency of the Chin National Front. It means a passport to a better future for them and their children, as well as the opportunity to be part of a much hoped for post-military, free and autonomous Chin state. Hence, they prepare carefully to ensure that they fulfil the prescribed description of what constitutes a refugee from the perspective of the UNHCR interviewers.
Before going into these different routes to attaining a legitimate identity however, I begin with a short overview of the changing conceptions of national belonging and citizenship, so as to contextualise the subsequent discussion on these various types of identity-generation.
CHANGING NOTIONS OF POLITICAL BELONGING
The idea of what it means to be a citizen has been evolving over time and while it still bears some resemblance to the early Greek conceptualisation of citizenry as being a person's exclusionary belonging to a city-state or polis that comes with certain rights and responsibilities, today's citizenship has become much more elastic, particularly as people have become more mobile. As Sassen (2006: 293) notes: "Immigration is a lens through which we can understand the strains and contradictions in nation-state membership". It can, as she further adds, lead to a "debordering of formal definitions and national locations", which is precisely what I see the Malaysian state and transnational actors engaged in. By "debordering" Sassen means that certain states, for instance, in recent times have allowed for dual citizenship, acknowledging the ability to belong to two states simultaneously. This is the case with Mexico, which in this way extends the ability to be Mexican beyond Mexican territory. Mexicans living abroad are not just able to vote in Mexican general elections, but to run for office, with their patriotism and loyalty not called into question (see Bakker and Smith 2008; Bakker and Smith 2003) . We also find states actively seeking to bring the diaspora within the national fold, as in the case of the African state of Eritrea which has offices in Europe as a way to maintain its ties with Eritreans living abroad and to solicit tithes that are channelled back to Eritrea under the guise of nation-building (Al-Ali et al. 2001) . This is the kind of "debordering" to which Sassen alludes, which involves a reworking of earlier Weber-inspired notions of state that were centred on citizenry tied to those residing in a specific territory.
Even within unitary state citizenship models it is possible to discern differing types of citizenship, what Sassen (2006) terms "partial citizenships", which accord some but not all of the rights and privileges of citizens, and "informal citizenships", which extend the privileges of a citizen, such as being allowed to work and reside within a state's borders, without any formal state-generated documents. The relative ease with which wealthy migrants with large disposable incomes are welcome to stay in Malaysia as long-term residents under the newly created "Malaysia My Second Home" programme 1 is in fact dispensing a kind of partial citizenship. As to instances of "informal citizenship", the acceptance by the Malaysian government of the long-term residency of Filipino nationals in Sabah is a kind of informal citizenship.
Such flexibility towards citizenry on the part of the state reflects its attempt to adapt to a changing international environment. This flexibility helps the state simultaneously to counter any threats to its sovereignty wrought by globalisation and an increasingly mobile global population; to exploit the benefits from this same phenomenon in terms of encouraging increased flows of capital and labour; and to comply with an international human rights discourse that emphasises the humanitarian obligations of the state in dealing with displaced persons and refugees. One could argue that this was the case, for instance, when Malaysia issued temporary residence visas to more than 30,000 Acehnese refugees after a devastating tsunami struck Aceh in December 2004. While not a signatory to the UN Convention on Refugees, the Malaysian state thus found a way to meet its international obligations through this temporary membership that did not extend to giving the Acehnese refugees full citizenship, thereby allowing the state to retain its territorially bounded and exclusionary citizenship model centred on notions of loyalty, patriotism, birth and race.
2 So even as it maintains its non-signatory status, the Malaysian government's complicit acceptance by of the UNHCR having an office in Malaysia, knowing that it is providing a pathway for groups like the Chin to attain refugee status, is arguably yet more evidence of this kind of flexibility adopted by the state. Besides these changing notions of state citizenship, there is also a burgeoning literature on ideas of a deterritorialised citizenship and/or political belonging with rights which are gained not through the state but through a global human rights discourse, often discussed under the rubric of post-national citizenship or transnational citizenship (see Faist 2000; Soysal 2007; Fox 2005) . Rather than national-based, these deterritorialised or transnational identity models are often cross-border in nature and centred around ethnic, cultural and religious affiliations, for example, the Islamic ummah (community). Another type of belonging which is gaining momentum in academic discourse is the idea of a cosmopolitan citizenship, an identity that has little to do with national ties and loyalties, but is instead centred around common, universal values -a kind of global ethos and lifestyle that often involves a high degree of mobility and a disengagement from the local and tribal instinct (Delanty 2006) .
But while these discussions and debates are intriguing, from my own observations at least with regard to the Chins and the Acehnese, stateconstructed identities remain as relevant as ever. In particular, the idea of a cosmopolitan citizenry which is delinked from the state remains one that is more theory than practice. Even Soysal, who is often credited with conceptualising the idea of post-national citizenship, acknowledges that the "nation-state remains a persistent depository of cultures of nationhood and still the most viable political organizational structure " (2007: 339) . This seems to be borne out by the actions of groups like the Acehnese and Chins who may operate cross-border and put forward their claims in terms of a transnational human rights discourse, but do so within a national paradigm and have their own aspirations to form their own nations.
The multiple and fluid conceptions of state citizenship mirror the Chins' and to a lesser extent the Acehnese own complicated and fragmented conceptions of themselves. With both groups, there is already a seamless and easy shifting back and forth between ethnic and national identities that reflects their own particularistic histories and predisposition to adopting flexible identities. Hence, adopting the identity of asylum seeker, refugee and permanent resident of a state, is simply adding to the list of the identities that they assume in order to acquire additional rights and legitimacy.
By exploring the means and methods that migrant transnational actors like the Chins use to co-opt state practices in producing their own legitimising identity, I am supporting the view that, despite talk of cosmopolitan citizenry, state citizenship remains the dominant form of political membership which even transnational actors aspire to gain, recognising its importance to their survival. However, before we get to that, this chapter considers the state's attempt to generate new Malays and how the Acehnese were able to benefit from this project of creating additions to the Malay population.
THE STATE EXPANDS ITS FOLD
As discussed in Chapter 2, the movement of people and flow goods around the Malay archipelago was commonplace in pre-modern times. Hence when in the mid-twentieth century the Indonesian and Malaysian states were carved out of this geographic region along with state-constructed territorial boundaries and immigration restrictions, it is hardly surprising that this did not stop the migration of people back and forth across the straits of Malacca between the newly founded Indonesia and Malaysia.
What is more surprising perhaps is the Malaysian state's complicity in enabling the Indonesian-born to become Malays by virtue of giving them permanent residency. In the 1980s, Malaysia found it politically convenient to do this in a state where population growth, immigration and ethnicity are all linked to the continued domination of the Malay-centric UMNO party. Malaysian electoral outcomes are typically aligned primarily along ethnic-racial lines. Hence, as Crouch (1996: 173) notes, "the nature of intercommunal relations is greatly influenced by the numerical strength of the various ethnic groups. Thus, the ethnic composition of the population becomes an issue in ethnic politics".
Immediately after independence, Malays and non-Malays were evenly matched in terms of size of population. Subsequently, however, the Malay population grew to 55.5 per cent in 1970 and to 60 per cent in 1985, a significant increase which Crouch (1996) attributes to a higher birth rate among the Malay population, but also to illegal immigration from Indonesia, particularly in the 1980s, which he argues served a dual purpose, that of fulfilling the country's labour market needs and altering the electoral outcome in favour of UMNO. According to Crouch (1996: 173) [the Indonesian] immigrants were then perceived as Bangsa Serumpun (from the same ethnic lineage) who would eventually assimilate with the local Bumiputra. Thus, in the long run the Indonesian immigrants were regarded to have strengthened the Malays' electoral power vis-a-vis the nonMalays because it was assumed that they will be assimilated with the local Malays.
Of the move to increase the Malay population through the assimilation of Indonesian migrants, Crouch wrote in 1996 (174):
While the Bumiputra population received a boost from illegal migration, the non-Malay population suffered a drain as middle-class non-Malays, especially those with professional qualifications, opted for migration to places such as the United States, Canada and Australia. . . . By early in the next century [i.e. the beginning of 2000], bumiputeras can be expected to outnumber non-bumiputeras by almost two to one. Unlike the emotional issues of education, language culture, and religion, the changing demographic balance has been greeted with satisfaction by Malays and accepted with resignation by This practice by the Malaysian state of providing migrants seen to be of similar racial stock as the Peninsula Malays with easy access to statesanctioned legitimacy was widespread and not just confined to peninsula Malaysia. Sadiq's (2005) study of the conferral of documentary citizenship on irregular Indonesian and Filipino migrants in the East Malaysian state of Sabah is another indication of how the state used irregular immigration in the 1980s and 1990s to alter the population demographics, with a view to changing the electoral outcome of Sabah state elections in favour of the ruling Barisan Nasional coalition. The rationale behind this practice, according to Sadiq, is to accelerate an ongoing policy of Malayization. He writes (2005: 116):
Legalising illegal immigrants becomes the preferred strategy of the dominant Malay parties when overt Malayization (through conversion, internal migration, etc.) does not proceed quickly enough. The goal of the Malays, who dominate the federal government, is to change the demographic and political character of Sabah so that it becomes Malay Muslim-dominated, and because of cultural-religious commonalities, immigrant Indonesians and Filipinos can easily be Malayized over time and will support Malay-Muslim parties.
Within this context of a domestic power play for political dominance by the UMNO party, thousands of Acehnese as part of the Indonesian diaspora were able to gain Malaysian permanent residency with relative ease in the 1980s. Among them were those who were to become part of the GAM leadership in Malaysia, including Usman Hanafi, Harun Thaib, Ramli Sulaiman, Tahir Hassan and Muzakir Manaf. Many of them received their permanent residency with the help of a local NGO, Aceh Sepakat, a Malaysian organisation set up in the 1970s to promote the welfare of people of Acehnese descent, particularly in the area of education. While it maintained an avowedly apolitical stance throughout the conflict, it did play a role in securing permanent residency for Indonesian Acehnese. Faisol Hassan, a Malaysian and former president of Aceh Sepakat, recalls this period in the 1980s, when he and others of Acehnese descent, such as Jakob Djuly, acted as intermediaries in this endeavour. "They would pass their application form to me and I would pass it on to someone at the national registration department to process" (interview, Kuala Lumpur, October 11, 2010). More than 20 years on, he cannot remember how many people he and the others like Jakob Djuly helped in this way, but in total he estimates as many as 20,000-30,000 Acehnese may have gained permanent residency in the 1980s through various channels, when the Malaysian government was receptive to Indonesians getting permanent residency. He also says he does not know why there was this opportunity, but assumes that it was partly to do with the often prickly Malaysia-Indonesia relations, as well as placing UMNO in a favourable position at election time 4 . Attaining permanent residency seemed to occur through informal channels and personal contacts, rather than any organised process. Faisol described it to me in the following manner:
Normally, you pass it [the application for a red IC] along with the 90 ringgit fee to someone in government, who passes it to someone who then passes it on to someone else. It changes hands several times. After that you don't know what happens. That's how it works. Then suddenly months later (anything between 20 to 60 days), I would get word that their application was approved and I would inform the person in question that he could collect the card form the national registration department. I really didn't want to know who handled it as it didn't matter to me (interview, Kuala Lumpur, October 11, 2010).
The advantages for GAM operatives of having Malaysian permanent residency in the form of the red identity card were many. They were able to run businesses of one kind or another, mainly grocery stores, facilitated by having legal documentation when applying for the requisite business licenses. This in turn meant that they were able to earn a secure livelihood in Malaysia, whilst being politically active at the same time. It also meant that their supporters, especially those who had similarly attained permanent residency, could provide a steady and regular stream of funds when needed, especially in the 1990s and early 2000s when the insurgency was its most active in Aceh. By having a legal foothold in the Malaysian state, their ability to be engaged in political transnationalism was also greatly enhanced as it allowed for easy mobility across the border as well as within Malaysia. They were able to go through regular border checkpoints, as opposed to having to enter through the irregular routes taken by those wishing to escape detection by the Malaysian authorities. Finally, permanent residency gave GAM operatives the ability to move through Malaysian society with relative ease, without having to fear being stopped by the authorities. In this way, Malaysia was able to become an important second base after Aceh and Sweden for GAM.
From my interviews with Acehnese respondents, however, it is clear that the window of opportunity for Indonesians to attain permanent residency in Peninsula Malaysia in the mid-1980s was finite and it closed sometime around the end of that decade (interview with former GAM members Bakthiar Amin and Mahmud Muhammad, Kuala Lumpur, April 10, 2009). In the 1990s, others who tried to apply found their applications were rejected. The application process also took far longer than the 60 days that was common in the earlier period. As a result, not all GAM operatives who lived in Malaysia were permanent residents. Some remained irregular migrants for the duration of their stay and in that capacity travelled back and forth between Malaysia and Aceh until the peace treaty of 2005. Hence, while permanent residency facilitated political transnationalism, it was not a decisive factor, as those without it were still able to operate, albeit less openly and with more challenges. But there is no doubt that a significant number of GAM operatives 5 did have permanent residency and this was certainly beneficial to them on a personal level and to the cause, for the stability and access into business that it afforded them.
As mentioned earlier, this route to state-sanctioned legitimacy via permanent residency was historically contingent and limited to those perceived to be of close cultural proximity to the Malays. This clearly precludes the Chins who have had to find other legitimising identities to secure their stay in the country. The rest of the chapter is devoted to looking at the ways in which the Chins have secured these identities.
THE MAKING OF A CHIN: THE ACR IDENTITY CARD
Hning Kwee was exhausted.
6 She had just spent seven days and nights travelling by bus, car and foot from Burma across Thailand and into Malaysia. Her fatigue was compounded by a minor fracas at the ThaiMalaysian border which involved the group she was travelling with running for dear life to escape Malaysian immigration officers, waiting for them across the wall, and which had resulted in bruised knees and shins.
But as tired as she was, the first thing she did upon arrival in Kuala Lumpur was head to the ACR office in the city centre, to get herself registered as a member. On a Sunday morning she sat in the waiting room, along with a handful of other people from Chin state, carrying a knapsack containing the only things she had brought with her from home. Some of the others in the waiting room were also there to become members, while yet others waited to get their card renewed. Hning Kwee's brother who had come three years earlier to Malaysia was there as well, to help with the registration process. At a small table, with an ACR committee member on hand, her details were jotted down on a form. Name, age, tribe, family village, marital status, father's name, mother's name, date of arrival in Malaysia, address while living in Malaysia, contact number. Once her details were taken, she was asked if she had a passport photo. "I do", she said. That meant she would be paying RM30 rather than RM35 if ACR had to take her photo. The same amount is levied for renewals. This is an important step for Hning Kwee en route to what she hopes is resettlement in a third country. Any would-be asylum seeker usually registers with either ACR or CRC, before they take the next step of registering with UNHCR as a person of concern. Her name must be listed on the CRC or ACR database in order to be considered a bona fide Chin. This is a precautionary, vetting measure, even though UNHCR conducts its own interview and assessment to determine the veracity of the asylum seeker's identity and claims. According to an ACR committee member, there are many who claim to be Chin when they are not. "How can you tell that someone like Hning Kwee is from Chin state", I ask. By her name and her village, I am informed. Particular names are known to belong to certain groups from certain parts of Chin state.
The identity card carries a certain value for those newly arriving from Burma, giving them some sense of security, going from an "identity-less" person to someone with a serial number and an authorising agency that gives them a degree of protection from police and RELA harassment. It also forms the first step to attaining the real goal -the UNHCR refugee card, which carries far more legitimacy and weight and which can lead to the hoped-for third-country resettlement.
After her details are taken down in the reception area, Hning Kwee is asked to wait while the card gets made. In the next room, the job of entering the personal information of new registrants or renewals into a computer database is done. As there is an exchange of money, the task falls to the two treasurers who are part of the ACR committee. Today Aung Zhaw is doing the registering.
Sunday is the busiest day for registering and renewing members. On weekdays ACR committee members deal with organisations like UNHCR, arrange for the hospitalisation of ACR members, help to arrange funerals of members and their family and try to assist those who have been detained by the police or immigration along with a host of other crises that crop up on a daily basis. In the registration room, Aung Zhaw sits at a table with a computer, a scanner on his left and a special printer that can print and emboss plastic cards. The machine, which costs a hefty RM7,000, sits on a sturdy safe (donated by a foreign embassy) where the registration fees go.
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He pulls up a formatted application form on the screen and referring to earlier written information, fills in Hning Kwee's details. On completion, he presses enter and the form recedes to reveal the full list of members plotted out on a spreadsheet. The software that the ACR office uses to register new members is specially devised by one of their own members who was paid RM1,000 to come up with a more efficient registration software program. With her data entered, her picture is scanned and resized to fit the card template. Her other details automatically appear on the card. Aung Zhaw issues a print command, and within less than a minute, Hning Kwee's card plops out onto the printer tray. She is officially an ACR member.
The card issued from the printing machine looks similar to the UNHCR refugee card or indeed any state-generated identity document such as a driver's licence or national identity card. The name of the organisation is emblazoned at the top, followed by the cardholder's registration number. Next to this is a passport-sized photo that was taken just minutes earlier by the computer's web camera. Further down are details related to name, gender, date of birth and country of origin. The issuing date and expiry date are right at the bottom.
On the back of the card, a message declares that the cardholder is an asylum seeker awaiting refugee status from UNHCR and asks for the goodwill of the authorities to allow her to live temporarily in Malaysia. The ACR hotline and fixed line numbers followed by an email address are printed at the bottom. Next to this information is the signature of the ACR chairman and the logo of ACR.
The card and the whole registration process, whereby the treasurer and elected member of the ACR committee take down her personal information after she was asked a series of questions, resembles the bureaucratic procedures of the state. It mimics the mechanics of how the state derives its authority by bestowing legitimacy on its constituents through the generation of such identification documents, the official line of questioning and finally the exchange of money to indicate that the transaction is final. Such activities also mimic state efforts to construct and maintain subjects through such regulatory mechanisms as taxation and other bureaucratic form-filling and an adherence to a penal code.
Both ACR and the CRC have been issuing a card since 2004. And both organisations are equally adept at evolving and innovating when it comes to subject formation. Initially no such documents were issued, then came the idea of issuing a letter from the organisation on behalf of the Chin asylum seeker. The letter evolved into a piece of paper encased in a plastic cover, which has now been switched to a much more sophisticated plastic card with an embossed photo. The software they use also makes the registration process entirely computerised, with the entry of new registrants automatically loaded into a membership database that can be searched and specific data, such as the number of people from a particular Chin township, can be retrieved within seconds.
Aung Zhaw of ACR says they collect about RM30,000 a month in registration fees, the main source of revenue for ACR, but that almost all of it gets ploughed back into operating expenses. These expenses include running the ACR office and school nearby, subsidising the women's group income-generating project and paying the small monthly stipends that he and other ACR committee members receive. It all adds up, so much so that the safe doesn't get used much, he jokes.
As the afternoon wears on, more people arrive. A group of young men from Tiddim come into the room. They accompany a new registrant who sits in a chair across from a webcam to get his photo taken. Within minutes he is out the door with his ACR card in hand. Among the new members, Aung Zhaw notes that people from Tiddim form the highest number of members. The average daily number of new applicants and renewals is between 30 and 50. Today the number of applicants was 38, so it was just another typical day at the ACR office. Having gotten her card, Hning Kwee then returns to where her brother lives, to rest. Tomorrow a whole new life in Malaysia filled with different challenges begins for her. Getting herself a socially constructed identity was the first step.
Kennedy, the CRC coordinator (until May 2011), sees the issuing of the identity card as the cornerstone of what the organisation provides to its members -a little security and legitimacy in an alien and often unfriendly environment, as well as certain services such as helping with the UNHCR registration process and assistance in times of emergency, such as hospitalisation or the death of a relative. At the CRC office, the registration goes on seven days a week from 9 a.m. till 10 p.m. At last count, the organisation had registered a little more than 30,000 members, each of whom would have been issued a CRC identity card (interview, Kuala Lumpur, November 20, 2009). As mentioned earlier, the CRC or ACR card is a transient identity, meant to act as an interim measure while the Chins wait for a more secure identity in the form of the UNHCR refugee status, and as I discovered, there is a process there too that the Chins need to navigate in order to get the much hoped-for refugee card.
LEARNING TO BECOME A UNHCR-SANCTIONED REFUGEE
The following case study illustrates how another identity is derived through the UNHCR-sanctioned asylum seeker and refugee status. But first, some details on the refugee scenario in Malaysia, particularly as it relates to the Chins. As mentioned in Chapter 2, Malaysia is not a signatory to the UN Convention on Refugees. Nevertheless, it has allowed UNHCR to set up an office in Kuala Lumpur and to process refugee applications, presumably in the knowledge that in doing so it would potentially draw more asylum seekers to Malaysia. While other factors need to be taken into account, such as the inner workings of the smuggling network and the geopolitical situation in the region (the increased levels of violence, famine and natural disasters in other countries), the fact that the number of asylum seekers coming to Malaysia has risen significantly must also be due in part to reports that would have circulated back home about the number of successful resettlements of their kin folk to a third country from Malaysia. In 1999, there were 45,400 refugees and asylum seekers in Malaysia (USCRI 2000). By 2008, that figure had more than doubled to 171,500, the largest percentage of which is comprised of Chins and Rohingyas from Burma (USCRI 2009). In 2010, Kennedy Lalram Lian, the coordinator of CRC, estimated that there were about 50,000 Chins in Malaysia and he expected that figure to rise in coming years due to family reunification (interview, Kuala Lumpur, January 3, 2011). At the time he also estimated that close to 40,000 Chins had been resettled under the UNHCR refugee programme, mainly to the USA. In 2010 alone there were between 4,000 and 5,000 successful resettlements from Malaysia and he expected the numbers to keep rising, so long as UNHCR keeps registering Chin asylum seekers in Malaysia. These figures are presented to contextualise the following discussion on the importance and significance of getting through the various UNHCR interview hurdles in order to be among those who do get resettled. It is difficult to get refugee status. The common belief among the many Chins with whom I spoke is that it comes down to one's "case story", which needs to meet with the approval of UNCHR officials.
Asylum seekers from Burma learn how to become a registered refugee mainly through an informal exchange of anecdotal experiences among themselves. This is how most Chins get news and information, but CRC and ACR also provide counselling on how to approach the UNHCR interviews. The counsellors, usually interpreters who work at UNHCR, advise on how to answer questions in a way that ensures the applicant gets through the various interview hurdles, so as to obtain recognition as a refugee and then get selected for resettlement in a third country, preferably the USA. This case study is the result of direct observation of the counselling process between a CRC counsellor and a refugee at the CRC office and later the observations of a UNHCR employee tasked with interviewing asylum seekers in the initial registration process. 8 We encountered Hning Kwee in the earlier case study: she had just arrived in Malaysia and made getting an ACR refugee card as her first priority. Her name will have entered the ACR database and she will become part of the name list that gets sent on to UNCHR. Soon she will get an appointment to get herself registered with UNHCR. Because she is new though, she will have to wait for a few weeks.
Someone who has been here longer and already has a scheduled appointment with the registration unit will sometimes prepare for the interview by paying a visit to either the ACR or the CRC office, where she will be counselled on how to approach the interview so as to not to slip up during the UNHCR assessment that determines who can be considered a refugee. Once they have an appointment in the UNHCR office, Chins know it is critical to get their story right with UNHCR officials, so as to fulfil their dream of resettlement after all the hardships and difficulties faced in getting to that point. Most come to Malaysia having left everything behind in Burma, including family members, and having borrowed a large sum of money in order to pay the smuggler's fee (RM2,500 was the going rate at the time of writing in 2010).
Hence, they seek advice from their community organisations, which may include being told to say certain things in a certain way to help them to appear consistent and to conform to the UNHCR conceptualisation of refugee. 9 Stella* 10 , the interviewee, was nervous. Originally from Hakha township in Chin state, she had been in Malaysia for several years and had gone through the initial rounds of the UNHCR registration process. As a result, she had already achieved refugee status the previous year. Tomorrow she would be attending the pivotal Overseas Processing Entity (OPE) interview which would determine whether the USA would accept her, and if so, which part of the country. Her husband had already left the previous year, and now she was hoping to be reunited with him.
At the OPE interview, which is about determining the veracity of her case story -the circumstances surrounding the reason she had left Burma and whether these fell under the scope of the UNHCR definition of refugee -she would be asked questions similar to those asked in previous interviews. "But it is never the same", says a Chin counselor 11 , who has sat in on the different interview rounds, from registration to the final resettlement interview (interview, Kuala Lumpur, January 20, 2010) . He notes that one interviewer may focus on the actual case story, while another may focus on the departure from Burma, when they left their village, when they arrived at the Thai border, and how. The UNHCR interviewer may also decide to go deeper into one particular aspect of the asylum seeker's case story, such as her education or work situation. The key, says the interpreter who also works as a counselor for CRC, is keeping the narrative consistent. "Sometimes they will say it took a week to come to Malaysia from Burma, then in another interview they might say ten days", says the counsellor. Any irregularities like these in dates and facts will be recorded and may cast doubt on the accuracy of the case story and lead to an unsuccessful outcome. Due to not answering correctly, the years of living in a state of limbo in Malaysia are made meaningless and futile.
Hence, a lot was riding on the OPE interview tomorrow and Stella was worried. Were they going to ask her about her case story or her husband's case story, she asked. If they ask about my husband's case story, what should I say, she wondered. These were her primary concerns, "Just say what you know" was the counselor's advice to her. "If you don't know the answer to something, then say you don't know, rather than make something up". The whole session doesn't last more than 10 minutes. The counselor does most of the talking, which is normal he says, especially when talking with Chin women. "In our culture, Chin women suffer an inferiority complex. They always think they are weaker than men and in need of more help for this kind of interview".
Another woman, also in her early 20s, comes into the room after Stella. Her question is also related to her husband, also resettled in the USA. This time, however, her concern is that she has lost contact with him since he went to the USA. Will that affect my own case? she asked. She was told not to be too worried as that was out of her hands, and UNHCR might possibly help her to locate him.
The counselor tells me:
It's about getting the facts right. So we always advise them to write down some notes about their case story before the first interview, when they left their village, when they reached the Thai border, how many days it took to get to Malaysia, and after each interview, to jot down what they mentioned and what was asked of them. Because you should be saying the same dates and facts every time the same question is asked of you.
As the counsellor later explained:
You have to stand by your story. People who make up their stories have very little chance of passing through the tests because there are many rounds and the story must always stay consistent. If they say they fled Chin state because of forced portering by the military, one interviewer may ask how many soldiers were in the camp they were attached to, and if you say one number in one interview and a different number if asked again in another interview, then it won't look good. So in the end, just saying what you really know or even saying you are not sure is better.
Emily*
12
, 27, was a teacher in Burma, based in Rangoon. She arrived in 2009 in Malaysia with just a few clothes and her bible. She admits that when she was interviewed at the mobile registration clinic she said she came directly from Chin state, rather than from Rangoon, and that while she did experience harassment, it was in Rangoon, but that she switched the location to Chin state.
I was told that it is easier for us if we say we are coming from Chin state. We (the Chins) live together so of course one of the things we talk about is what to say during our interviews. When someone's application is rejected, we try to find out what the issue was, so that we can avoid it. It's important we say the right thing otherwise all the sacrifice it took to get here to Malaysia would have been wasted.
Trying to conform to the UNHCR emphasis on biodatas is an alien concept to the Chin culture and way of life.
It is not part of our culture to be documented. Many people don't even know their birthdays, or how old they are. We are not interested in documentation, as it has no relevance to our lives. For instance, it is not important for the farmer to have certificates to show who he is. His identity comes from his family, from his clan and his village. As Burmese nationals we don't even get a birth certificate when we are born. The first kind of documentation we get is when we enter school and get a registration card that indicates our age,family name and village. Then there is a below 18 identity card which we receive when we are a teenager and above 18 card, later. But so many don't have the below 18 card because they live in rural areas far from town areas where they need to register themselves. (Interview with Thla Hei Lian, Kuala Lumpur, January 20, 2010) We now turn to the other side of the process -the interview at UNHCR, wherein I try to capture the process of becoming an UNHCR-sanctioned refugee from the perspective of a UNHCR employee who conducts the initial registration interview with asylum seekers wishing to gain refugee status. Due to the sensitivity and confidentiality of such interviews, I was unable to directly observe a registration interview. Instead, I obtained a detailed account of the interview process from this person who worked with the registration unit at the UNHCR office in Kuala Lumpur. In his account he described a typical encounter with an asylum seeker. It so happened that the day before we met he had interviewed a Chin seeking asylum (but it should be noted that he interviews people of various nationalities and ethnic groups), so I asked him to recall what took place while maintaining the man's anonymity.
The UNHCR Interview
Kenneth* 13 is a Malaysian who when I interviewed him had been working for UNHCR in the registration unit, as an interviewer, for little more than a year (interview, Kuala Lumpur February 9, 2010). The following is a description of what he says is a typical day for him.
He arrives at the UNHCR office every day at 8 a.m. and prepares himself for a series of interviews that he will do that whole day. He sits in a small, spartan room comprising a computer, desk and three chairs, one for the interpreter who sits next to him and another across from him for the asylum seeker. On a busy day he might see about 20 people, with each interview lasting anywhere from 15 to 20 minutes for an Accelerated RSD (Refugee Status Department) interview, or half an hour if Kenneth determines that the applicant is not eligible to be fast tracked and therefore must go through the normal series of interviews in order to attain refugee status and eventually be resettled.
14 The purpose of this registration interview is twofold. The most immediate priority for the interviewee is to get an UNHCR card to indicate that he is a refugee. This will give him some measure of protection from detention and arrest while in Malaysia. The other purpose is to start the process of securing the ultimate objective, which is resettlement to a third country. Under the fast-track programme, the whole procedure which in the past used to take several years can now take just a year -from the initial registration to the final step of being put on a plane heading more often than not to the USA, Canada or Australia, this last phase being the responsibility of the Resettlement unit.
But first, the applicant must get past Kenneth and other interviewers like him who work in the registration unit. There are already several people who are waiting for their name to be called. On this particular day, a man from Chin state has the first appointment and is shown into Kenneth's office. An interpreter, who is of the same tribal group and therefore speaks his mother tongue, will sit in for the duration of the interview. This is now Kenneth's account of what transpired during the interview, again, which he says is typical:
This man was in his early twenties and says he is from Thantlang township in Chin state. He came to Malaysia in the early part of 2009.
I always start the same way, by introducing myself and the interpreter and to explain what this process is for. I also tell them that if they have any questions they would like to ask, I will answer them at the end of the interview. The majority won't ask any questions though, they are just relieved that it's over and they can leave. Most of them come in looking very nervous, understandably so, and I try to make them feel at ease by offering them some candy from my candy bowl. I first ask if they have been registered before and then I get their thumb print. We started using the biometric system last year, where we make computerised images of their thumb print and this has really helped with cutting down the number of fraudulent applications.
Then I will ask them some basic background information, name, age, family background, mother tongue, place of birth, where they were living in Burma before they came to Malaysia and occupation, if they had been working. I also ask them about their educational background, as in, when did they leave school and if they went to university, what they studied.
Part of what we are doing is try to determine if they are telling the truth and to see if there is any discrepancy between what they tell us and later when we follow up with other questions, sometimes things don't add up. If they are Chin, and are Cho they should be able to speak that particular dialect. Or sometimes they state they are a particular age, say sixteen and they look much older, at least someone in their twenties. Then we will query further. If we are left unconvinced of their account then we will recommend that he go for another interview rather than recommend him straight away for refugee status.
In the case of this young man, because he is Chin and a Burmese ethnic minority, he is interviewed using the accelerated RSD form, meaning that he is asked fewer questions about his background and that the bar is set lower for him to get refugee status.
Once the biodata details are taken down, which I input into the computer, we begin the most important part of the interview, his claim and reasons for applying for refugee status.
So in this man's case he told me that he had fled Burma because he was forced to porter for the Burmese military. The procedure we are told is that at the village level, the village chief council (VCC) is asked to get one person from each household in the village to do portering when it is needed by the army. So his account was that he had been called up by the VCC and that for several days he had been forced to carry supplies for the army through jungle terrain without food and that he was continually beaten if he couldn't carry on. Because of that he says, that he couldn't take it anymore and he fled in the middle of the night from the camp while the soldiers were sleeping, back to his village. Here he was advised by one his family members to leave the country as the military would be on the lookout for him. So from his village he made his way to Yangon [Rangoon] and then to Kawthoung, the ThaiBurma border before making his way to Malaysia.
According to Kenneth, this account is commonplace. Almost exactly, word for word. The interview hurdles a typical applicant must get through are the initial registration interview conducted by Kenneth and other interviewers like him, the refugee resettlement determination interview (if there are doubts over the veracity of the case story), the resettlement interview, and if they are selected by the USA, interviews are conducted by two US departments -OPE and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Emily, mentioned earlier, who worked as a teacher in Burma, has dreams of moving to the USA. Like so many Chins with whom I have spoken, she wants to get a university degree, a master's degree if possible. She says she plans to eventually return to Burma to set up a women's NGO. But first she must clear the hurdles of becoming an UNHCR refugee, so she can live in relative security in Malaysia while she waits for the next part of her journey to begin. And if that means conforming to what a Burmese refugee should be, as constructed by UNHCR guidelines, then she will do so.
CONCLUSION
Upon an investigation into the importance of identity and belonging among migrants, we find that some like the Acehnese have found ways of inserting themselves into existing Malaysian state-constructed memberships that are historically and racially grounded. If that is not an option, as in the case of the Chins, we are able to see how they innovate and create new transient identities or find ones that are linked to an international regime rather than the state.
This chapter, as with the two preceding chapters, has been about trying to understand the interplay between the Malaysian state and the Chin and Acehnese migrants. These intersections and meeting points are extremely varied in nature. They can take the form of actual physical encounters between state actors and migrant transnational actors, as we saw in Chapter 6. But these interactions can also take place in other ways and through other mediums, such as procedurally, in the act of creating new state subjects and identities. If we imagine the state as a purely functional apparatus, then these intersections will not come to the fore. Sharma and Gupta (2006: 27) make a case for thinking of the state as that which is "produced through everyday practices and encounters and through public cultural representations and performances", rather than "as pre-constituted institutions that perform given functions" which has typically been the view of political scientists.
The business of subject formation and identity construction is clearly important for migrant transnational actors. For the Acehnese, who were able to become permanent residents of Malaysia, this afforded them a certain level of security and mobility that the Chins have not enjoyed to the same degree. Having permanent resident status meant that it was easier for the Acehnese to become entrepreneurs in Malaysia and to run small grocery stores, which is common within the Acehnese community. This meant that many GAM operatives were able to secure funds and to travel with greater ease, as compared with the Chins. Nevertheless, informal membership, or human rights discourse-constructed membership in the form of a refugee status, has been sufficient for the Chins to survive in Malaysia, albeit on a less secure level -but secure enough to have a CNF branch in Kuala Lumpur to which its constituent base manages to contribute small sums of money. It should also be noted that the strategy in terms of using Malaysia as a base has always been different for the Chins. For them, Malaysia is seen primarily as a transit point before moving on to a Western country, with the hope of returning to Chin state a far off prospect, perhaps not achievable at all for the older generation. By comparison, the Acehnese for the most part have been able to take advantage of the close proximity between Aceh and Malaysia, to return to postconflict Aceh to live and to move back and forth in a way that the Chins have not been able to do.
What we see with subject formation practices, be it by state actors or transnational actors, is that the processes in trying to build a citizenry are often similar, with the transnational actors mimicking state bureaucratic practices in their attempts to register and document a person's identity by gender, place and date of birth, and so on, and in the levying of a registration fee and annual renewable fee in order to procure an identity card which intentionally bears the same authoritative look and feel of a state-generated identity card. The procedures I witnessed at the ACR and CRC office, in generating these cards, would not look out of place at a state-run national registration department.
A final observation, when considering all these various identities, is that the state remains a pivotal player, because the identities are constructed within state territory with the implicit or explicit cooperation of state actors. The UNHCR refugee card and the Chin identity cards, for instance, are only useful provided the Malaysian authorities see them as legitimate. The identities discussed in this chapter also serve to illustrate the state's instrumental use of identification practices in order to expand and contract its membership at will, to allow certain civil and social rights to a particular group temporarily, for example, the refugee status, but equally to "switch off" these privileges when it so chooses, reinforcing at these times its non-signatory status of the UN Refugee convention and deporting asylum seekers in the same manner as any other irregular migrant. In Chapter 2, we saw examples of this.
Hence, as mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, while some may talk of a cosmopolitan or global citizenship, national belonging which is rooted in a particular territory remains, at least for the foreseeable future, the main route to a status-bearing identity even for migrant transnational actors. For it is through these state-enabled temporary or partial memberships that migrants are able to gain the necessary tools for survival and advancement, namely security, income and mobility. NOTES 1. Introduced in 2004 and managed by the Ministry of Tourism, the programme offers ten-year renewable visas that come with certain provisos attached, for example, a minimum investment of RM300,000 in the country. 2. Further on in this chapter we shall see how the Acehnese were able to gain permanent residence status with relative ease in the 1980s. But this was not the case in the 2000s. The sheer magnitude of the arrivals in the wake of the tsunami, plus a changed electoral landscape as compared to the 1980s, would have made the notion of presenting all the Acehnese fleeing the disaster with permanent membership status untenable for the Malaysian state. 3. With the benefit of hindsight, Crouch was not far wrong in his projections.
In a population census undertaken in 2007, the Bumiputra population had swelled to 66.4 per cent far outnumbering the second largest ethnic group the Chinese at 24.9 per cent and the Indians at 7.5 per cent with those falling into "others" amounting to 1.3 per cent. 4. As Crouch (1996: 173-174) suggests, many of the undocumented Indonesians who were granted permanent residence status would have gone on to become full-fledged citizens, thereby enabling them to vote in elections, presumably for the party most aligned, culturally and religiously speaking. In the case of the GAM operatives I spoke with, however, I did not encounter any who had made this transition to full citizenship, probably because they had little interest in doing so. 5. It is difficult to know exactly how many, without doing a comprehensive quantitative-based study which this researcher has not conducted. 6. This account is based on my own personal observation having spent time at the ACR office observing the practice of issuing ACR identity cards over a period of several weekends in November 2009. The process is very similar to that of the CRC office which also issues their own card to members. The name mentioned is a pseudonym. 7. Much of the equipment used by CRC and ACR in their offices are in fact donated by NGOs, churches and even embassies. 8. My observation of the counselling process was carried out over a number of days in January 2010. But this particular account is derived from my observations on January 20, 2010. All those involved asked that their real names not be included, hence pseudonyms are used. 9. This account should not be read as an indictment of such practices. Rather it should be understood in terms of the various hurdles that people, who are often desperate and looking for a way to leave a failed state and a bleak future, must overcome in order to conform to subject formation practices constructed by the state and international agencies, if they are to get a new lease of life in a third country. 10. A pseudonym has been given to protect her privacy. 11. In this case, the CRC counsellor was an interpreter who worked at UNHCR. UNHCR often hires interpreters who are themselves asylum seekers. Having sat in on these assessment interviews, the counsellor would know how UNHCR approaches the interviews and the kinds of questions that are normally asked by the interviewers. 12. Emily is a pseudonym to protect the respondent's identity. 13. The person I interviewed spoke on condition of anonymity, hence a pseudonym has been used. 14. This is usually when some of the details provided by the asylum seeker are viewed as requiring further scrutiny and questioning.
